

THE *Polit. Pamph. Vol. 101*
TRUE INTEREST

OF THE

HANOVER *Treaty*

CONSIDER'D:

And How far FRANCE, and the rest of the
ALLIES, may be depended upon.

By a Lover of his Country.

*Ille mihi ante alios, fortunatusque Laborum,
Egregiusque Animi, Qui, nè quid tale videret,
Procubuit moriens: ———*

*Nulla Salus Bello? Capiti cane talia demens
Dardanio, rebusque tuis:*

*----- Et Opes nobis, & adhuc intacta Juventus,
Auxilioque Urbes sociæ, populi que supersunt.*

Virg.

L O N D O N,

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wick-lane, MDCCXXVII.

(Price One Shilling.)

Y
I
the Honor of statu
ing Your Excellency's
I stand, You will be
it being
A
You



TO HIS
EXCELLENCY

The Right Honourable

Horatio Walpole, Esq;

*His BRITANNICK MAJESTY'S
Ambassador at PARIS.*

S I R,

IF this Address ever has
the Honour of salu-
ting Your *Excellency's*
Hand, You will soon see
it design'd to approach

A 2

You

Dedication.

You with no indirect Meaning, nor the least Air of Adulation: For I have not made Your *Excellency* a Personal Visit these four Years; and You are gone quite out of my hearing, upon the highest Employment His *Majesty* can send a Subject; I mean the Good of *Europe*, as well as his People.

How well Your *Excellency* is capable of acquitting your Self in Both these, I have the Honour of being perfectly informed,

Dedication.

ed, by one of the most
dis-interested Hearts, and,
perhaps, *best-inform'd Heads*
in all our *Senate-House*.

His Description of the
Force and *Clearness*, in
which Your *Excellency*
placed the Affairs of *Eu-*
rope, gave me no common
Emotion; because I con-
sider'd, that the Interest
of *France*, in her Attach-
ment to the *Hanover Trea-*
ty, was one Part of my
Subject; yet the Pleasing-
ness of that Emotion was
soon check'd by a due Re-
flection

Dedication.

fection upon my own Inability.

Still I have the Satisfaction of meaning well: And can comfort my self besides, even in such a Privacy of Life as mine, that my Country was never under a more auspicious Circumstance, than she now can boast: That His *Majesty* has the Heart and Confidence of his *Parliament*, beyond any preceding King: And his *Ministry* can no sooner suggest their faithful Sentiments,

Dedication.

ments, but his Royal unerring Mind is sure to collect the truest and the best.

Your *Excellency* has a Temper, I know, the most peculiarly Humane; and will easily forgive an unknown Friend, may I presume to call my self, when I offer at wishing with the fondest Zeal that Your *Excellency* may behave as *gloriously* Abroad, as Your *most Noble* Brother does at Home,

Dedication.

Home, to the entire Satisfaction of His *Majesty* and every *true* BRITON.

I am,

Your Excellency's

Most Devoted, &c.

The true INTERESTS of the
HANOVER *Treaty*
 CONSIDER'D:

*And how far FRANCE, and the rest of
 the ALLIES, may be Depended upon.*

AFTER what has been already
 publish'd by so able a *Hand*,
 and on so perfect an Informa-
 tion of the Affairs of *Europe*, as we see
 in a late Tract, entitled, *An Enquiry*
into the Conduct of GREAT BRITAIN,
 it wou'd very ill recommend the pre-
 sent Undertaking, if I shou'd offer to
 say one Word to that part of the
 Subject.

That *excellent Performance*, accord-
 ing to the known Accuracy of its
Author, has left no Gleanings to be
 gather'd up by Those who come after
 B Him;

Him; and nothing untouch'd, that needs to be reply'd to; nor unexplain'd, that can be call'd doubtful.

He has fairly unravell'd all the Entanglements of the *Austrian* and *Spanish* Counsels, stripp'd them of their Pretences, and plac'd the Secret of their Machinery in full Perspective to the View of the rest of *Europe*.

He has made it evident, that while the Pretence has been the defending their own Dominions, and maintaining the Trade and Peace of their own People; the true Design has been the Overthrow of the Liberties, and destroying the Commerce of *Europe*; the erecting an exorbitant Power upon the Rights and Properties of their Neighbours, and raising *Feuds*, *Faction*, and *Rebellion* among those peaceable Powers; who once were their best Friends, or rather Protectors, and are still their *Creditors* for both *Empire* and *Kingdom*: And all This contrary to, and in Contempt of, the most sacred Tyes of *Gratitude* and *Benefaction*, and in Breach of the most solemn *Treaties* and *Conventions*.

This,

This, I say, is all done to our Hands, and nothing but inveterate Prejudice can remain unsatisfy'd, after a serious Perusal of that Treatise.

If any thing has given occasion for a farther Explanation express'd in my *Title*; it can only be suppos'd to come from an Enemy's Quarter.

Here they have found a Place to fix their Battery, and to insinuate Doubts and Jealousies among us, in order to weaken the Confidence, and lessen the Prospect, which all the *Al-lies* seem to have from one another, and on which they so much depend, for opposing the Designs of their Enemies: As if an *Alliance*, which so many apparent Dangers, and the mutual Defence of so many *Nations*, made necessary to them all, shou'd not be equally their Concern to maintain, as it was equally their Interest first to form!

To scatter these Clouds, and counter-act the Delusions of a certain Faction among us, the time seems to call for a further Explanation to our People, of the whole *Scheme* of this *Al-*

liance: The *Original* and *Occasion* of engaging in such a *Treaty*; the *Reasons*, which induced every particular Member to accede to it: Which same *Reasons* will appear to be equally good, and effectual to preserve every one of those Members in the hearty pursuit of the Measures agreed upon, for its Preservation; and consequently will be good *Reasons* to prove, according to the Intention of this Essay, its *Stability*, and Certainty of Duration.

Nothing can be a surer Tye to the several Powers, engag'd together in this, or any other, Alliance, than the Obligation of *Interest*.

To prove that it is the *Interest* of every *Prince* or *Nation* concern'd to adhere steadily to their Engagements, is sufficiently to prove, that *They will do so*: Because *Interest* is never untrue to it self, is seldom deceiv'd, and as seldom prevaricates: And if you tell me, which Party it is a Prince's, or a Nation's, *Interest* to join with, I shall easily, without any Hesitation, pronounce which Party that Prince, or Nation, shall engage with, and espouse; unless

unless you will first suggest, that Prince, or Nation, infatuated to their Destruction; or under the Influence and Awe of some other Power, to whom they are bound, at the Expence of their *Safety*, and *Interest*; then indeed they may act, but not in the Capacity of a *Free State*, which is ever supposed to exercise its Reason, and act by the Measures of its general Interest.

To enquire then into the *Stability* of the HANOVER *Treaty*, we have no more to do, than to examine, *what form'd it?* If it was the just Defence of the *Allies* mutually and respectively; if it was their Safety, the Preservation of their just and stipulated Commerce, and the Prosperity of their Subjects; as long as these Reasons subsist, which brought them together, so long we depend upon the Stability of their Union. If any thing occurs to change that Interest, it may, indeed, be a Shock to that particular Party, (and so any Member may change his Party) but it does not shake the general Rule at all; *viz.* That *Interest* is the *Guide* of *Nations*: It only shows that what may be the Interest of a Nation at one time, may

may not be so at another, as either Circumstance or Situation may differ.

This is giving the utmost Latitude to an Objection, which is, perhaps, the only Cavil that can lye in the Case before me; or at least, that is of any weight: And the Answer is so direct and full, that the Objection is at once destroy'd.

For as I shall first make it appear, That the *Hanover* Alliance is form'd upon the true and undoubted Interest of all its *Allies*: So if I also prove that Interest cannot change or cease to be, nor any of the Parties drop off, or fall from their Engagements, I shall have satisfied what I ventur'd to advance; that the *Hanover* Alliance is stable and indissoluble in its Nature, and in all its Circumstances; and that the Enemy can have no hopes upon the Instability of *any* of its Members.

An *Englishman* should be ashamed to think, there was any occasion of entering into the Merits of this Question; or that the Enemy shou'd affect any Projects upon so remote a View.

Yet

Yet so it is; and therefore the Argument, such as it is, ought to be search'd to its weak Foundation.

There are, generally speaking, but two Moving Principles to Mankind, in the Case of *Interest* and *Parties*; which are *Hope* and *Fear*.

Both these form that Term of Art in *Politicks* call'd *Interest*. Let us see how they Both stand in the Affair of the *Hanover* Treaty; where we shall soon find them Both concurring to the *Stability* of the Alliance, even in every Member of it.

If the *Vienna* Treaty had any thing formidable in it, 'twas in its first Appearance: The Power of *Spain* and the House of *Austria*, and their Friends and Allies united, might justly carry an Air of Terror with it, while the rest of *Europe* were disconcerted, and in a divided State.

Very well: From hence their Fear summon'd the other Allies, and urg'd them to form an opposite Union for
com-

common Safety, and against the threatened Danger: being by such a Cement firmly united, and in consequence of that superiour Strength effectually freed from that Fear; *Hope* then, with her sanguine Aspect coming in to their Aid, joyns to consolidate and establish that Union; and the dreaded Power of the Enemy is rendred less and less.

But then, as upon any Breach of this Union, or Alliance, the superior Strength of the Members, upon which their Safety is form'd, vanishes, and the Terror and Apprehension of the Enemy's Greatness returns; That very Circumstance is an unanswerable reason of, and full demonstrates the Stability of, that Union itself; because the *Hope*, the *Safety*, and Interest of all the Parties secur'd by the *Hanover* Treaty depend upon its Duration. ——— To bring it down to *Particulars*; for 'till then it is only *Speculation*.

I am content, for the Occasion, to allow that the *Vienna* Treaty or Alliance, made a most formidable Appearance in its Beginning; and the more it was so, the stronger are the Reasons, and the more
more

more prudent and politick the Measures, in forming a Counter-Alliance of such powerful Members, and in so seasonable a manner. The Effect of this Alliance has been such, and in so short a time, even before the Members of the *Vienna* Treaty have been able to take one Step in prosecution of their Designs, that it has disappointed them in almost all their projected Schemes; it has drawn from them the Powers they most depended upon for Assistance, and intercepted them, in drawing together the Strength they had secur'd; and occasion'd such Difficulties among them, as have quite chang'd the Situation of all their Affairs.

But if, after this happy Beginning, the *Enemy* can persuade us that this Counter-Alliance, and these new Engagements, which the Powers concern'd in it have entred into, are *precarious*, and very *unlikely* to *last*; that some of its Members may be induc'd to separate, and quit sides; such a *Suggestion* may, indeed, rob us of much of our Strength, if it ever shou'd prove so in the Event; but the Suggestion seems rather calculated to infuse *Jealousies* among our

C

Allies,

Allies, and a *Diffidence* among our *Selves*, about the Consequence of the War; and *Disaffection* at least among the *lower* part of His Majesty's Subjects.

But I mean not to point this Discourse at any *particular* Person, or Party, or Nation, or Sovereign: I shall therefore state the thing with as much Impartiality as possible; and give first a short Account, upon what particular Interest the *Hanover* Alliance was *form'd*, and what were the true Causes that brought the several Powers at first into the *Treaty*; and then, in the Second place, I shall refer it to the Judgment of the *Impartial* part of the World, whether it is probable, those Reasons will ever have less Force with those *Allies*, than they had at the first.

The Alliance was form'd at *Hanover*; the Parties were his *Britannick Majesty*, his *most Christian Majesty*, the *Dutch*, &c. The Principles or Fundamentals, on which the Treaty was founded, were the Exorbitant Power, and growing Friendship between the *Emperor* and King of *Spain*, and the dangerous Superiority they evidently push'd at, and the

the Consequences of it, to the other
Confederating Powers.

First, To his Britannick Majesty ; an evident concerted Design to invade his Majesty's Dominions in favour of the Pretender ; and to raise War and Rebellion in the Heart of his Kingdoms, in the Name of a Popish Impostor ; and also, in the mean time, to invade the Commerce and Trade of Great Britain, by setting up a new East-India Company at Ostend ; and a Demand of Port Mahon and Gibraltar, the only Acquisitions which Great Britain enjoy'd, after a long expensive War, in virtue of solemn Treaties.

Secondly, To his Most Christian Majesty ; an evident Advance of the Austrian Greatness, always incompatible with the Interest of France ; and which is prov'd to be so, by the constant Emulation of the respective Governments and the Jealousy between 'em, ever since the Reign of Francis the 1st, and the Emperor Charles the Vth. But particularly more dangerous to France, as there is a reserv'd, secret Picque, between the two separate Branches of

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the

the House of *Bourbon*, the *direct* and the *collateral* Lines; and the Danger there is of King *Philip*, or his Posterity, reassuming the Crown of *France*, in case the present most *Christian King* should have no Issue; and all this in spite of the most solemn *Renunciations*, and the *Guarantee* of all the Members of the ancient Confederacy.

The *Dutch* were not the least Sufferers, or the least in Danger, from the threatening Consequences of the *Vienna Treaty*: The Emperor was already become their most formidable Neighbour; instead of such a Friendly one, as He might have been expected from the Faithful *Services*, which their *High Mightinesses* rendred his Majesty in *obtaining* those *Possessions*.

Their Commerce was invaded; a new *East-India* Company was erected; their Troops in the Barrier Towns but ill paid, and but indifferently Treated; and Themselves, as a *State*, menac'd with the Resentments of the *Emperor* and *Spain*, if they offer'd to pursue such Measures as they judg'd most conducive to the Interest of their State.

They

They found themselves press'd by their own Necessity to seek a powerful Protection; or, in default of it, to sink under the Terror of the formidable Powers, which, as it were, surrounded them: For the *Emperor*, having engag'd the Princes of the House of *Bavaria*, wou'd by Consequence bring in the Elector of *Cologne*, the Bishop of *Munster*, and the Bishop of *Leige* into the War; so that the Dominions of the *States* seem'd to be invell'd, except on the side of *Cleves*; and their *East-India* Trade, the great Article of their Commerce, wou'd soon be invaded in such a manner as manifestly threatens the utter Ruin of that Commerce, laying it open both to the *Flemings*, whose Market is just at their Door; and to *Spain*, who discovers an evident Design of enlarging his Settlement at the *Philippines*, and to make an Encroachment upon their Spice-Trade; which he can very easily accomplish, by reason of his Neighbourhood to their *Spice-Islands*.

The *Dutch* have found all their *Remonstrances*, and most serious *Expostulations*, at the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*,

Madrid, of no Effect to obtain a Redress of these Injuries; nor any Hopes of an Accommodation, without giving up their *Interest* and *Properties* as well as *Commerce*.

The *Dane* and the *Swede* are in the same Circumstance, from the overgrown Greatness of *Russia*: The *Czarina* has acceded to the Treaty of *Vienna*; and will at least attempt, sooner or later, the Restoration of the Duke of *Holstein* and *Mecklenburg*; and her Power at Sea needs no Description: It will be happy if the *Dane* and *Swede*, united, can keep the Passage of the *Sound*, and the Command of the *Baltick*, upon its old Foot. I might go on to state the Interests of several other Powers, who may be expected for their common Safety to accede to the *Hanover* Treaty; but there are enough already enumerated, to tire the Patience even of a flegmatick Reader.

These are the *Interests*, or some of the Interests, which bring these *Powers* into an *Alliance*, and which they never can be said to *recede* from, without

out *abandoning* and *resigning* up themselves to an *irretrievable* *Ruin*.

Yet in order to prosecute this Enquiry, it is necessary to enter into a more particular Discussion of the several Interests of the *Hanover* Allies, and to evidence the moral Impossibility of any *Defection* of Parties: The Consequence is plain, *viz.* That by this we take away all the Prospect of discouraging our People, and extinguish the Hopes, which a *malicious* Race of Men among us have entertain'd, of spreading *Doubts*, *Discontents*, and *Fears*.

The Head of this Alliance, (I suppose, so much may be fairly granted us) is His *Britannick* Majesty: The Scheme was form'd in his Royal Breast; it was the Effect of his Prudence and Foresight; his general Knowledge of the Interests and Affairs of *Europe*, founded in the most *exact* Intelligence and *full* Information of Things; thus much general Fame ascribes to his Wisdom and Conduct.

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The Interest of his Majesty's own Dominions, both *British* and *German*, and the universal Good of all his Subjects, the Safety of the whole *Protestant* Interest, and the Protection of the neighbouring Powers, who were in manifest Danger of Oppression, These were the *grand* and *primary* Motives to all his Majesty's just Desires.

I might add, tho' this was apparently no War of *Religion*, notwithstanding the Endeavour of the Church of *Rome* to have made it so, I say, I might add, the *Safety* and *Liberty* of Religion had a Share in these Interests; for what *Right*, *Protection*, or so much as a *Being* cou'd the *Protestant* Interest expect, when the *Spanish* and *Austrian* Monarchies, those ancient Persecutors and profess'd Enemies of the *Reformation*, shou'd have arriv'd to such a fatal Superiority of Power, as the *Vienna* Alliance evidently aim'd at?

But I shall have Occasion to mention this Part again; at present only, I say, this is no War of *Religion*; it is no Alliance form'd for the *Church*; it is a needful Engagement for the moral

ral Security of Nations, and the preserving Civil Right, and Protection of Commerce; the ballancing the Power and Peace of *Europe*; and, for this Reason, were the Allies *Roman*, *Lutheran*, or *Reform'd*, as the Foundation is the same, so is the Structure; and the *Stability* of the *Alliance* being establish'd by the *known Interests* of the Allies, there is no room to question the *Firmness* of the *Parties* to their Engagements. To begin with ourselves.

What can be suppos'd to shake the Interest of *Great Britain* in this Alliance, or to slacken our Zeal in the Prosecution of it? Can we abandon an Alliance fram'd for our *Security* and *Glory*? Can we decline a Confederacy, without giving up the Interests of our Neighbours, as well as our selves; without suffering our *Merchants* to be *prohibited*, where by Treaties they are admitted, and our *particular* Commerce to be *invaded*, which by many Stipulations must be own'd to be *exclusive*?

Can *Great Britain*, of all the Nations in the World, admit a new *Ma-*
D
rine

rine Power to spring up in a remote Nook of the World, and in a Nation remov'd but a little way from *Barbarian*, and part of them to this Day professedly *Pagan*? Shall this be suffer'd to rival the Naval Powers of *Europe*, and show their Streamers and Pennants in the *Atlantick* Ocean; at the same time that they insult our Beneficent Sovereign, by favouring the most Contemptible Enemy of his Person, and Pretender to his Crown?

This is an Interest that can never change, and *Great Britain* can never withdraw from this Alliance, from being the most *essential* Part of it, and first Wheel of all its Motions.

For as this very Interest has already carry'd on two separate Wars against *France*, when *France* was in the most powerful Condition that ever was recorded since *Charlemain*; can it be suppos'd to be in the Power of this *modern Conjunction* of such distant Countries, to injure this Interest; or awe *Great Britain* in her Pretensions to *Arbitration* and *Umpire*?

Great

Great Britain is the *Life* of the Treaty; all the *Protestant* Councils of *Europe* receive Vigour from hence: So that here might be a place indeed to enlarge upon the Merit of *Great Britain* in the *previous* Conduct of his *Majesty* for the *Interest* of all the *Allies*; how He, before the Alliance was fully form'd, held the Hands, and put a Bridle, as it were, into the Mouth of those who were ready to triumph before the Victory; and while some of the *Allies* were hesitating, and deliberating, and as unprepar'd as unresolv'd, His Majesty by his timely Aid, and vigilant Measures, confirm'd and preserv'd them.

Thus the *British* Fleet appear'd at *Revel*, and block'd up the *Muscovite* Ports.

Thus another *British* Squadron block'd up the *Galeons* at *Porto Bello*: And a Third made a strict Cruise along the *Western* Side of *Spain*.

But my Work is not Panegyrick; nor do I think the World needs any Testimony to assure them of the *Rectitude* of his Majesty's Counsels, and the

the *Steadiness* of *Great Britain*, as a Nation, which can't but be true to its own Treaty; nor is his *Most Christian Majesty* in any Sense to be suspected of paying a less hearty Regard for this Treaty than our selves. His *Christian Majesty*, tho' young in Administration, yet very wisely pursues the Dictates of his *Political* Interest; and, whoever are the Advisers, is thoroughly sensible how dangerous the Measures of his Uncle the King of *Spain*, and the *Emperor* his new Allie, must needs prove to the Interests of *France*; and how evidently they tend towards erecting an excessive Power in the House of *Austria*: A Power, which *France* has twice been put to the Expence of an infinite deal of Blood to oppose, and which in its Nature is so essentially destructive of the true Interests of that Kingdom.

Nor was This all; A View of Civil Distractions from the Side of *Spain*, in Case of his present Majesty's Demise without Issue; or, indeed, whether so or not, if Power gave room for it, was not so remote, but the *penetrating* Counsels of *France* cou'd see into it;

it; even thro' all the *Renunciations* and *Guarantees* of Princes, which had been pass'd at the Conclusion of the last War.

As these have been the Causes, or some of the Causes, and Reasons, which brought his *Most Christian Majesty* into those Measures, and join'd him to the *Hanover Alliance*, the same Reasons will for ever be of like Force to preserve the *French Nation* in a constant Pursuit of the same Interests; nor do I think there is the least reason to doubt of the Sincerity of the *French* in their Part of the Alliance, any more than we have of *any other* of the *Allies*, or if I had said than *our selves*.

It may, perhaps, seem a little strange, because new to us, in *England*, to see a *British* Interest leagu'd with a *French*, a *Protestant* with a *Popish*; but if we will allow our selves to look a little into *History*, and see the Reasons of Things, and how Tempers and Circumstances alter as Times alter, the Wonder will soon be at an end.

France

France was the ancient Enemy of *England*, when *England* and *France* struggled for Room in the World; when their Kings contended for Dominion and Glory, and the *English* possess'd almost all the *Southern Coast* of *France*; then *France* might well be restless with such a Neighbourhood.

But take *France* in its latter Circumstances, and except the late War occasion'd by the Ambition and Encroachments of *Lewis* the XIVth, and which was not a War betwixt *England* and *France*, but, in some Sense, between *France* and *Europe*; I say, excepting this, we find *France* often embark'd with *England* in Defence of the Liberties of *Europe*; and that particularly just as it is now, against Encroachments of the *Emperor* and *Spain*.

Henry VIII. and *Francis* I. frequently join'd their Forces to reduce the *Emperor Charles* V. (whose Power threaten'd *Europe*) to the Necessity of a Peace: And it is remarkable that tho' *Henry* VIII. sometimes chang'd Sides, yet had not *Francis* I. with an unweary'd Vigour and Constancy oppos'd

pos'd and check'd the growing Greatness of the House of *Austria* at that Time, *Charles V.* had certainly overrun all *Europe*, and extinguish'd the *Reformation* in its Infancy.

Francis I. always secretly upheld the *Protestant* League, call'd the League of *Smalcald*, and frequently made Diversions in their Favour; I may venture to say this was not in Affection to *Them*, as *Protestants*, but for his own Interest to distress the *Emperor*: And it is true it was so: But then this is directly to my Purpose; it was always, and I may venture to speak it without any Pretence to Prophecy, ever will be the true Interest of *France* to oppose the *Emperor*. And as Interest is always true to it self, so *France* and the *Emperor* never did, nor can long agree: Their Interest is not only not the same, but diametrically opposite; they are the Scales in which the Weights will never be equal, but if one goes up, the other must go down.

Five times during the Reign of *Henry VIII.* *England* and *France* were leagu'd against the *Emperor*. And had
not

not *Henry VIII.* been more fickle and unsettled than *Francis*, the *Emperor* had certainly been reduc'd; but He acted the political Part, not willing either of his two Rivals shou'd outshine him in Glory: Thus Interest kept them *always* fighting and *never* conquering; without enquiring into the Principles of either *Protestant* or *Roman Catholick*. For *Religion* had no Concern in the Quarrel of those Times, but *Common Safety*, *Balance of Power*, the *Liberty* of *Nations*, and the *Civil Rights* of *Parties*; and so it has been in the most important Cases ever since that Juncture, and will be so to the End of Time.

Nor is it any Reproach to the religious Principles of Kings, to say, They League together for the Preservation of their own and their People's Rights, their Liberties and their Commerce; as if no Wars were just but such as were made for Religion; whereas if Fame may be credited, most of the *Church-Wars* in the World have been as ill founded, and have as little to be pleaded in their Defence, as, perhaps, the other Quarrels among Mankind.

Civil

Civil Right is to be maintain'd; Liberty may and ought to be defended: Exorbitant Power is dangerous, and ought to be oppos'd: The Breaches of publick Faith and Treaties call aloud for Redress: These Things admit of no Dispute; and Wars, made on these Foundations, are every where agreed to be just.

Henry VIII. leagu'd with *Francis I.* Anno 1528; the Reasons given on both Sides were expressly mention'd, in their Alliance, to be for *mutual Defence* and *Preservation*; that is, the *Interest* and *Safety* of their Kingdoms. See *Rymer's Fædera*, Tom. XIV.

Anno 1529, the former Alliance having been discontinu'd upon some *Niceties* between the two Princes, it is expressly given in Monsieur *Rapin's* History of those Times, as the Occasion of what follow'd: His Words translated by *Tindale* are thus: "*Francis*
 " saw too plainly that *Charles V.* af-
 " ter having in a manner subdu'd *Ita-*
 " ly, was in a fair way of making him-
 " self absolute in *Germany*; having re-
 E " duced

“ duced the Protestants of the League
 “ of *Smalcald* very low.

The Consequence of this was, that *Francis* bestirs himself to renew his Alliance with *Henry VIII.* assisting the Protestants on one hand, and the Princes of *Italy* on the other; and the Reason is given in these Words, because the *exceeding Growth* of the *Emperor's* Power cou'd not but be *fatal* in the end to *France*.

This is directly to the Case in hand; for as it stood then, so it happens now: The same Cause, in all likelihood, will produce the same Effect: The apparent Growth of the *Emperor's* Power cannot but be fatal to *France*; and therefore it cannot but be the Interest of *France* to adhere to their Allies, and to be steady in an Alliance entred into purely to reduce the Exorbitance of that Power.

But not to dwell here: From the Year 1620, to the Year 1648, the same Thing is exemplify'd. The mighty Power of *Ferdinand II.* became the
 Terror

Terror of the Protestants; The King of *Bohemia* was beaten by *Mansfield* at the Battel of *Prague*, 1629; and Count *Tilly* gain'd a Victory over the King of *Denmark* at *King's-lautern*, 1625.

The Protestant Princes, particularly the Dukes of *Mecklenburg* and *Pomeran*, were dispossest'd of their Dominions by *Wallestein*; and *Tilly* threatned the Elector of *Saxony* with Ruin: The Protestant League (call'd *the Conclusions of Leipzig*) begun to be abandon'd, and all *Germany* was in imminent Danger, and just at its last Gasp: The Princes of the *Augsburg* Confession were generally aw'd by superior Forces; and the Emperor's Army consisted of little less than 100000 Foot and 30000 Horse: In this Juncture *France* seriously interpos'd, and tho' the Government of *France* was then, as it always was, *Roman Catholick*, yet it could not but look upon it as an undeniable Truth, that *France* was not to suffer the Imperial Power to swell to any greater Pitch, such a Power being utterly inconsistent with its own Interest; Upon which *Lewis* the XIIIth made no scruple in joyning

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with the Protestant Interest, and with Protestant Princes; and invited the *Swede* into their Assistance; the Great *Gustavus Adolphus* being supported in his Expedition into *Germany* with *French* Troops and *French* Money; and *France* at last openly came into the Protestant League against the Emperor, and trusted the Command of her Armies to Duke *Bernard* of *Sax-weymar*, a Protestant; who besieg'd the City of *Brisac* for *France*, and after a tedious and bloody Siege took it. Nor was it any Argument to distrust *France*, to say, they were *Roman Catholics*: The Question to *France* was not Religion, but Exorbitant Power: An *Emperor* aiming at making himself Absolute in *Germany*, and Formidable to *Europe*; an *Emperor* in strict Amity and Union with *Spain*: And the same Principles which guided *Francis I.* govern'd *Lewis XIII.* that the *Emperor's* Power was never to be suffer'd to grow Fatal to *France*, by its growing Greatness.

This Principle, this strict adhering to the Interest of his Country, engag'd *France* to come into the *Protestant* League;

League; and that too at a time when she was under the Administration of a Cardinal, the Great *Richlieu*, as she is now under That of *Fleury*.

If there is any Arguing from what has been; if the same Principles may be expected to produce the same Effects; if the Interest of Kingdoms and People is the Guide of the wisest and best Governments now, as it was then; It must follow that the present exceeding Growth of the *Emperor's* Power is Dangerous, and will in the End prove Fatal to *France*, unless prevented by a powerful Alliance.

This is the just and equitable Scheme of the Treaty, and upon this Foot the King of *France* came readily into the *Hanover* Treaty; and as he came into it with this View, so this will for ever, and upon all Occasions, secure the Attachment of *France*, to every Alliance that shall be made to secure the Peace of *Europe* against the *Emperor's* Encroachments; or the *Emperor* and *Spain* United.

It

It is worth observing, what an exact Parallel there is in the Circumstances of the past and present Time; that in all the fore-quoted Junctures, when the *German* Power was so particularly formidable to *France*, it was the *Emperor's* Fortune to have *Spain* on his side; and as the Wealth of *Spain* was infinitely their Advantage, so it made them so much more the Terror of *Europe*, and of *France* in particular.

For Example: *Charles* the Vth was actually King of *Spain* as well as *Emperor*, and was in Possession of *Spain* and the *West-Indies*, and receiv'd immense Wealth from *America*; for it was in this Reign that *Cortez* conquer'd *Mexico*. As he was at the same Time Emperor of *Germany*, so he had Possession of all the *Netherlands*, not only those we now call *Austrian*, but all those which the *French* now possess, and are call'd the *Pais Conquis*; and all the United Provinces, now subject to the *States-General*: He had besides almost all *Italy*, as the *Emperor* has now; and all the other *Austrian* Dominions except *Hungary*; so that he was exceedingly Great
in

in his Possessions, as well as Warlike and Brave in his Temper; and nothing but such a Hero, as the King of *France*, then could have born up against Him: which made it a Maxim in the Politicks of *Europe* at that Time, and which holds good to this Day, that *France* and the *Emperor* can never long be Friends; their Interests are incompatible, and they ever did, and must, oppose each other.

It is enough; We need look no farther back; History is useful as the Cases are so exactly similar; but the Nature of Things sufficiently proves the Fact, tho' we had no Example of the like Cases to refer to. *France* is the Mark every *Emperor* and King of *Spain* shoots at; What have they in View else, which offers to their Ambition? *France* is surrounded by these two Powers, and so is made, as it were, the Barrier to the rest of *Europe*: *Spain* can come at none of the Powers of *Europe*, but either thro' some of the remoter Provinces, or else thro' the Heart of *France*: The *Emperor* can make no Conquest any where else; To turn his Arms *Northward*, would be to make
War

War with the *Empire* itself; and fight one Hand against the other, and Both Hands against the Head.

To look *Southward*, is to rouse sleeping Lyons, and make War against the *Turks*; where he has made as many Conquests as he can keep, and desires nothing but the quiet Possession of what he has got.

To look *East* is to Quarrel with his Friends, for the *Poles* and the *Muscovite* seem to be, as it were, his own, at least in Expectation: But *France* alone is the Mark of any *Emperor's* Ambition: so that it must ever be the Interest of *France* to keep the House of *Austria* within due Bounds, to check it from being the Terror of any of its Neighbours: This is certainly the present Interest of *France*; it has ever been so, and ever will be so, while keeping a Ballance in *Europe* is Essential to its Peace.

In the next place, I must add, upon the same Foot of Interest, that it must be the Business of *France* to have an Alliance with *Great Britain*; or the
rest

rest of the Allies to have an Alliance with *France*, especially as the War is to be carryed on with *Spain* and the *Emperor* together.

Without such an Alliance, *France* would be alone in the War against Both, and be every where surrounded by the *Empire* and *Spain*: and tho' *France* is a very Formidable Nation, and their Troops very good and very numerous, yet when we are to consider the Circumstances of such a War, *France* must be in a very embarrass'd Condition must exert its utmost strength, and have considerable Armies at the same time on every side. Besides all these Armies, *France* must, if Alone in the War, fit out a good Fleet at Sea; for *Spain* would not be so easily overmatch'd at Sea by the *French*, as they have been by the *English*: *France* would be ill able to prevent the *Muscovites* lending the King of *Spain* twenty Men of War, if they desir'd it: nor is it any Injustice to *France*, to say, their Naval Power at this Time is not equal, at least not superior, to that of *Spain* and *Muscovy* in Conjunction: So that *France* is many ways strengthen'd by
F. that

that Alliance; many Openings in her Strength are made up for her, and she is sensibly assisted almost every way; and to suggest that *France* should decline the *Hanover* Alliance, is to suggest, *France* is utterly to seek about her own Interests, which is not to be suggested with Reason.

Again; *France* could not, like *England*, have block'd up *Revel* and *Porto Bello* together, and kept a Squadron at the same time cruising upon the Coast of *Spain*, sufficient to make the *Galleons* and *Flota* afraid of coming home.

Thus *France* is apparently oblig'd to the *Hanover* Alliance, for all this *Apparatus* of the War, as I may justly call it; by which they are enabled to appear in the Field with Formidable Armies, with the greatest Ease, and least Hazard and Expence both of Blood and Treasure; while the Enemies are harrass'd by their own Disappointments, and so kept back as, perhaps, not to be able to take the Field at all.

But

But suppose we were to grant *France*, single-handed, could exert Strength enough to defend itself against the joynt Attempts of the *Emperor* and *Spain*; it must be granted at the same time, that the Exigence must be infinitely greater, and the Hazard of miscarrying much more so; whereas now the Load will be eas'd among several Shoulders, and as to the Danger of miscarrying there is so little Room for it, that the Enemy does not seem to expect it.

If then it is the Interest of *France* to reduce the Power of the Empire to a Ballance, and keep it from Encroaching upon them; it is certainly their Interest to fortify Themselves with such Alliances, as may put them out of Danger, whatever the Efforts of their Enemies may be; and upon this Account they may be depended upon, for their steady adhering to those Alliances.

The *French* are too wise, not to know their true Interests; we see them as seldom taking wrong Measures of that kind, as any Nation whatsoever; and therefore we find them now as

warm in the Pursuit of the common Cause as any of the Allies, and as Determin'd to behave so to the End.

But to come nearer to them still: *France* has a great many Reasons at this Time to wish for a Breach with the *Emperor*, and with *Spain* too, (suppose it may be upon good Terms) particularly such as their being separated from such formidable Alliances as supported the Imperial Power in the late War; and, I doubt not but this View made them close with the very first Offers of the *Hanover* Treaty with the greater Readiness; and the same Reasons will hold good for their pushing it heartily on, now they are engag'd.

'Tis manifest that, as we say, *England* always gains by a War with *Spain*, (as has been proved by a late Author, in a Tract call'd *The Evident Advantages of a War with Spain*) so it is a receiv'd Maxim in *France*, that the *French* always gain by a War with the *Emperor*; and we need go no farther back than to the late War, for a Proof of this, still recent in Memory; for
tho'

tho' in *Flanders* and *Italy* Things went against them at last, so as almost to be fatal to the whole Interest of *France*; yet look thro' the former Years of that long War, and you will find the *French* Armies always worsted the *Germans*; were always in Action before them, or out-did them in Number or Stratagem, if not by mere Fighting; and this was the Reason that the *French* were always Gainers by the War, falling into their Provinces, exacting immense Contributions, and plundering whole Countries before the slow *Germans* cou'd get into the Field: And This besides what they gain'd by Encroachments too in Treaties and Congresses, in which they were generally too hard for the confederated Princes of the Empire, and made a Market of them almost on every such Occasion: So that except the last, *France* always made a Gain of a War with *Germany*; this is a good Reason why *France* rather desires a War with the *Emperor*, than with any of the other Powers of *Europe*.

It is but too apparent the *Emperor* was made very great by the late War:
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The Addition of *Milan* and *Mantua*, and almost all *Italy* on that side, and the *Spanish Netherlands* on the other; the reducing *France* to the Limits of the *Rhine*, and giving up all the Strengths beyond it to the *Emperor*: As this made the *Emperor* excessive strong, and gave him a Greatness, which 'tis Evident he ill knows how to guide with Moderation, and which places him, at least in his own Imagination, so much above the Powers, to whose Favour he owes all these Acquisitions; so it was a great Mortification to *France*; and the Prospect can't but be highly acceptable to her at this Time, to see her self arriv'd at a *Crisis*, when she may be restor'd to the Confidence of her Neighbours and Allies.

France was brought in the last Age to the brink of Ruin, by pushing at Exorbitant Power: and Experience, so dearly bought, is seldom lost upon a Wise Nation; so that *France* perhaps may be Cautious of relapsing into the like Danger: but *France* too, for the same just Reasons, will be a Faithful Assistant, and may be depended upon,
for

for opposing any Power, that shall affect the same Superiority.

The present Power of the House of *Austria*, as link'd in with *Spain*, *Poland* and *Muscovy*, is already too great, as has appear'd and been Demonstrated beyond Contradiction, by the Author of the ENQUIRY.

And *France* is too penetrating not to see into this; and their Share in the Danger will not suffer them to sit still, and expect the Consequence; They share in the Injury done their Commerce, by admitting the *Emperor* to a Free Trade to the *East* and *West-Indies*; Themselves being excluded from the latter, with an high Hand and Disdain, by the *Spaniard*: They share in the Secret Projects of the *Spaniard*, to embroil them with Factions, in behalf of a Renounc'd Succession; They share in the Menaces of the *Emperor* upon their Neighbours, as well the Princes of *Germany*, as the *States-General*, whose Ruin it is of the last Consequence to *France* to prevent.

France

France sees the gathering Storms from the *North*, as fatal to the Commerce and Navigation of the *Baltick*, as the numerous Armies of the *Empire* and *Spain* are likely to prove in the *South*.

France has too much Interest in the Peace of *Europe*, to behold all these Prospects with Indifference, or to suffer such Power to spread any farther: Her Interests will never allow her to rest in a State of Indolency and Supineness, while Affairs so essential to her immediate Preservation are agitated about Her: These Considerations will effectually secure Her to the *Hanover* Alliance. Nor is it the least Ground of the Expectation of the Age, that the World sees a Young King, at his first setting out, paying a just Regard to his Treaties, and warmly pursuing the True Interest of his People: nor can it be suggested, that in a Course of Years, when he becomes better acquainted with the Art of Governing, he shall be less fond of Exerting it; or that his Wisdom shall not improve with his Years.

From

From his Most *Christian Majesty*, let us take a Survey towards the *South*; and see how it is the same Thing with the other Allies: and there we shall not only discover the same Principle prevailing, but we shall also find the same Ground for acceding to the *Hanover* Alliance, the same Principle to prompt and invite to the Treaty.

The *Swiss* Cantons, that Laudable Confederacy, who have been so many Years united, and have been so eminently true to their Union, notwithstanding Differences in Religion, are brought into this Treaty by common Views of Safety and Interest, while they are situated in the very Arms, as it were, of the Imperial Power, and are many ways under Obligations of Commerce to the *Emperor's* Dominions, receiving from *Germany* Supplies both of Corn and Salt, and Returns in Specie for their Horses, Cattle, and such Things as they sell in *Germany*.

What tears them out of the Arms of the *Emperor*, with whom they have been in Constant Alliance, almost a Century? Is it not their common Interest, their common Safety? Is it not the Publick Good, that constant Pole-
G
Star,

Star, by which wiser Nations are ever steer'd?

What inclines the King of *Sardinia*, a Prince acknowledg'd by All a Master in Politicks, who has testified so often, and in a manner so Extraordinary, that he clearly understands his own Interest, and has Courage to pursue it; what gives us Reason to believe that this Prince either has, or will, embrace his *Britannick* Majesty's Alliance, but the apparent Proofs of its Security and Interest?

Is not the *Emperor's* Power already too strong for him, in *Italy*? Is not the Tyranny of it become a Proverb in every Province? How has he been treated by the *Emperor*, for all the Services he perform'd, for the Risques and Extremities he sustain'd? With what Difficulty and Reluctance did his Imperial Majesty execute those few Stipulations he entred into with him, for some small Fiefs? and are they really all yet perform'd, after so many Years Expectation?

How did the King of *Spain* fall upon him at first, and force his Kingdom of *Sicily* from him, so lately resign'd to him by the Peace of *Utrecht*? and how did

did the *Emperor*, upon his being put into the Possession of it, give him the Island of *Sardinia* only; an Exchange so much to his Loss, that his *Majesty* had little Reason to accept it, but for the Preservation of a Title? Can it be this Prince's Interest, to see the *Emperor* and *Spain* again United? and how long may he promise himself the Possession of his last Kingdom, if that Union subsists? Or rather, how soon may he be mock'd with Two Kingdoms, and possess'd of none?

If any Prince in *Europe* has Reason to tremble at the Approach of *Imperial* and *Spanish* Greatness, it is the King of *Sardinia*, who lyes apparently expos'd to Both, so as no Prince or Power in *Europe* is expos'd besides himself. *Spain*, unrestrain'd by the *Hanover* Alliance, can at Pleasure wrest *Sardinia* from him, his *Sardinian* Majesty having no Ships to oppose such an Attack, or to transport an Army for the Relief of his Subjects. Three or four Men of War would be enough to form a Superiority in this Case; so that his *Sardinian* Majesty has no Power to resist the *Spaniard* by Sea, and is far from being a Match for the House

of *Austria* by Land; and must be in a very precarious Condition, upon the least Caprice or Disgust of those Powers, if he had not such a Harbour to shelter in, as the *Hanover* Treaty.

Indeed the Peace of the King of *Sardinia*, like that of the little State of *Genoa*, depends upon the jarring Interests of the several Powers, who border upon him; who generally envy one another such a delicious Morfel, as the entire Reduction of *Savoy*: As it is not the Interest of the *Emperor*, that *France* should seize any part of the King of *Sardinia*'s Countries, so it is of *France*, *vice versâ*; and it is as surely the Interest of the King of *Sardinia* that neither of those Powers should be so much too strong for the other, as to be able to force or subdue him.

The Power of the *Emperor* and *Spain* being therefore, by this Conjunction, at this Time apparently threatening, and by its Exorbitance becoming the Terror of *Savoy*, He finds it his immediate Interest to fly to the *Hanover* Alliance; that is, to seek the Protection of *France* and its Allies. Just thus, in the late War, it was his Interest to adhere to the *Emperor* and His Allies, against the threatening

ning Power of *France*, then also join'd with *Spain* in the same View of Encroachments upon its Neighbours.

Why did the Duke of *Savoy* always take his Lot with the *opposing* Powers? why act in Conjunction with the *Defensive* Party? but because he always fought for *Safety*, and judg'd the *Liberty* of *Europe* to be his own *Security*; and that he cou'd not long survive the Ruins of the Weakest, being little able to defend himself against the Force of the strongest.

But not to take upon me to say what particular Views the King of *Sardinia* may now have, and from what Reasons of State *He* may now act, I only suggest that his *Sardinian* Majesty will certainly be true to his own Interest, that is, the Safety of his Dominions, and the Preservation and Prosperity of his Subjects.

Some intimate, that a *Neutrality* is his best Interest; I will not pretend to determine whether that be so or not; tho' I am clear in my own Opinion concerning that Point also: But I think it needless to enter into it here; because it is usual in such Cases for the contending Parties to refuse to grant

a *middle* Power the *Privilege* of a *Neutrality*, when they cannot come at one another, but thro' his Dominions; as is exactly the Case here; for it is certain the *French* and *Imperialists* cannot come near one another in *Italy*, if the King of *Sardinia*, insisting upon a *Neutrality*, prevents the Passage of *Troops* thro' his Dominions; but he cannot expect that the most Powerful of the Parties will submit to be so check'd by an Inferior Strength, as if he had not Power to force a Way through.

The Interest therefore of that Prince is to joyn with that Power which is most able to *Protect*; and to do it so, as to prevent the other from being able to *Oppress*.

It is said, indeed, that the *Emperor*, or the Party acting for him, are able to make Such Proposals to the King of *Sardinia*, as are sufficient to turn the Scale of Interest, and make it worth his while to joyn with him; but to say what the *Emperor* is *able* to do, and what he is *likely* to do, must certainly be Talking upon two very *different* Things.

It is true, the *Emperor* may make great Offers; He may propose to give the King of *Sardinia* the Dutchies of
Milan

Milan and *Mantua*, with the Title of King of *Lombardy*; and who could outbid such an Offer? but the *Milaneſe* is too precious a Spot of Earth to be parted with, but upon valuable Conſiderations. But who ever heard that the *Emperor* yet parted with any Thing, which can be kept? When he does, we muſt ſuppoſe him reduc'd to a ſtrong Neceſſity of making the Conceſſion; or elſe that He is ſo much in need of the King of *Sardinia*, as to give ſuch a Price for his Friendſhip: therefore when there is a Greater *Probability* of the Offer being made, it may be *time enough* to to argue upon *that* part of the Subject.

Yet, improbable as that Offer is, it may not be ſo very foreign to my Subject to conſider, what poſſible Entertainment his *Sardinian* Maſteſty might give to ſuch an Overture from the *Emperor*.

His *Sardinian* Maſteſty muſt be acknowledged to equal moſt of the Princes of *Europe* in *Solidity* and *Penetration*: *Solidity* to form a Judgment upon ſudden Emergencies; and *Penetration* to provide againſt the Diſtreſſes of every wrong Event.

In

In this Light you always see him pursuing steadily the *true Interests* of his *Dominions*, and the *Honour* of his *Alliances*; but it will carry the Compliment too far, to suggest, that he can be amus'd with *Promises* instead of *Realities*; because the greater the Promise, the greater Room to suspect the Punctuality of Performance; especially while the promising Power has no Body to account to, for the Breach of his Word, or Insincerity of his Meaning.

Nor is his *Sardinian* Majesty to be inform'd, how much more Glorious it wou'd be, not to his *Person* only, but to the Conduct of his present *Reign*, and to all his *Posterity*; that, in a Juncture so critical as this, the Safety of *Italy* were secur'd by the Wisdom of his Counsels, and that the Ballance were preserv'd by the Weight of his Power.

We shou'd be far from doing Justice to the Penetration of his *Sardinian* Majesty, if we shou'd offer to imagine he cou'd not see thro' all the Offers of that Kind, which the *Imperial* Court may condescend to make; or that he cou'd believe, such extraordinary Overtures cou'd be made upon any other View than that of *Resumption*, as Time may serve.

Nor

Nor can the *Imperial* Power ever want such an Occasion: Princes never want Room to demand, where their Interests direct; nor do they want Reasons to enforce them, if they do not want Power to support them.

How often has the Dutchy of *Milan* prov'd the Source of Contention, between the Houses of *France* and *Austria*? How often did the respective Powers of *France* and *Austria* depose and set up, and again depose, and set up, the two *Sforza's* Dukes of that Country; yet never wanted a Pretence any more for setting them up, than for pulling them down; dispossessing them as often as they pleas'd, and as often as they saw themselves in a Prospect of maintaining that Possession without them?

How wou'd his *Sardinian* Majesty be dispos'd to relish such Caprices of Fortune? to be the Duke of *Milan* to Day, and a private Gentleman to Morrow; as was the various Fate of those *Sforza's*? How wou'd it suit with the Dignity of his Family, and the Views of better Things, which are now before him?

Besides, we can no more suppose, at
H least

least not upon a mature Judgment, that the King of *Sardinia* wou'd think himself more effectually establish'd in the Sovereignty of the Dutchy of *Milan*, than the Duke of *Lorrain* cou'd think himself secure under *Lewis XIV*, when he had two High-ways made thro' his Country for the March of the *French* Armies into *Alsace*.

Nor cou'd, in such a Case, his *Sardinian* Majesty expect any Favours from the House of *Austria*, except that being the most powerful of all the Princes of *Italy*, he might have something of what we call *Polyphemus's* Courtesie, the fleeting Satisfaction of being *last devour'd*.

And this brings me to speak of the other *Italian* Powers, who begin, it seems now, tho' late, to be alarm'd at the Formidableness of the *Vienna* Alliance; which, like a Collection of dark Clouds, gathers about them, and which they can't but see is generating Thunder, ready to burst over their Heads, unless it happens to be diverted by an early Refuge in the *Hanover* Treaty.

It is no Wonder, I say, to hear these Princes begin to be alarm'd, and to look out for a Shelter.

To

To speak first of the Great Duke of *Tuscany*, a Sovereign, and a powerful, if a *Free* Prince: But the combin'd Powers are determin'd to give him Law, in such a manner, as is almost without Precedent in the World; disposing of his Dominions, as if he had never been Proprietor; and directing the Inheritance, without asking him a Question.

This I mention, not that the Thing is so strange in the Practice of those *two* Sovereigns, who have been us'd to treat *inferior* Powers after this manner, when it has been for their Purpose to *oppress*; but as it is something new in this Part of the World, and at this Time, when the more *powerful* Princes have thought it proper to form *Leagues* and *Alliances* to *prevent* such *Invasions*.

Who can wonder that the Duke of *Tuscany*, and perhaps the Neighbouring Princes and States, such as *Genoa*, *Lucca*, *Modena*, and *Parma*, shou'd at last think of taking common Measures of Safety in the *Hanover* Alliance? On the contrary, who can't but wonder, that they shou'd not have done it much sooner? That they shou'd not long be-

fore have rous'd from their Dream of Security, and have let the *Emperor* and *Spaniard* know that they would not so tamely give up their Sovereignities?

Interest must guide them to this, and, as I have said, *Interest* is the *Pole-star* by which all the *prudent* Princes of the World must steer. And we can hardly see any Room to doubt, but the Princes of *Italy*, and especially the Duke of *Tuscany*, must have their Eyes so far open'd to their own Affairs, as to see, they are as certainly to be swallow'd up in the projected Greatness of the House of *Austria*, as it is certain that they have, just now, a *Door open'd for their Escape*. Both are undeniably conspicuous; and a *third* Thing may be as safely urg'd; that this is the *last* Offer of the Kind they will ever be bless'd with; at least, it is the last they have reason to *expect*; for such Occasions, like Time's Emblem, are just to be taken by the Fore-lock, the Instant they occur.

The Court of *Tuscany* is no more unacquainted, than the Court of *Turin*, with the Encroachingness of the House of *Austria*; they have been alternately crush'd by the *Austrian* and *Spanish* Powers,

Powers, as the Ballance has gone up, or down, in their Favour; and 'tis on this Account that the *Tuscan* Court has acquir'd the Reputation of always acting by the most exquisite Politicks, in keeping themselves above Water in so many Floods; and preserving an *Independency* among all the Invasions of their powerful Neighbours.

But now the very Root of *Tuscany* is struck at: They are not privately, or covertly, aim'd at; but the Sovereignty is avowedly taken hold of, as a Right: The House of *Medici's* is unhappily extinct in the Male-line, at the Demise of the present Duke, and the Dominion is seized upon by *Compact*: It is dispos'd, as it were, in Dower: One Claims to have it, and the other Claims to give it; and the Consent of the Possessor is never requir'd; but the Receiver shall marry the Giver, and so the Claim becomes singular again, in that united Power which threatens not *Tuscany* only, but *Italy* with Destruction.

It may be the same thing with the State of *Venice*, tho' at present the Danger is a little more remote from them, notwithstanding the Neighbourhood of the *Austrian* Dominions; but, Thanks

to

to the Neighbourhood of the *Turk*, that the Danger comes no nearer.

But, above all things, it must be the Interest of *Venice* not to pick any Quarrel with the *Hanover* Allies; either those who are nearest, as *Savoy* or *France*; or the remoter Powers of *Great-Britain* and *Holland*: for these last, perhaps, are more capable of weakening the *Venetians* than the former; these can touch them in the most sensible Part, by interrupting their Commerce; and in truth, if they please, are able to put even a Period to their State, in spite of all their Forts and Batteries at *Molomoco*; and can burn their Fleet in the very *Arsenal*, and save their *Senate* the Charge of putting to Sea.

But Father *Paul*, in his Advice to this State, left it among other fine Reflections, as a Rule of *lasting* Policy, that
 “ *England* is a Power to be *courted* for
 “ ever; and that all good Usage must be
 “ shewn by our Governors to the *Eng-*
 “ *lish* Merchants trading in the *Le-*
 “ *vant*; and particularly all *Treaties*
 “ and *Engagements* with them must be
 “ observ’d; because there is *no* Nation
 “ that puts a greater Value upon their
 “ *Word*

“ *Word* than the *English* do, and the
 “ *Kings* of that Island have not yet
 “ learned the *modern Policy*, that gives
 “ ’em leave to *break their Faith*, in or-
 “ der to *reign more absolutely*, and car-
 “ ry their Tyranny beyond their own
 “ Bounds.

Thus I have, with the utmost Impar-
 tiality, stated the *true Interest* of all
 the *Parties* in the *Hanover Treaty*,
 and shew’d upon what Foot they became
 Members; and how that *one* and the
same Foundation has been the *Basis* of
 the whole *Superstructure*.

Nor it is strange, that so many dif-
 fering Views should at once meet in
 the same Point, and that one and the
 same Measure should hit the Politicks
 of so many Nations of *various*, and, some-
 times, *jarring* Interests.

An unanswerable Confirmation of that
 Sovereign Maxim, *that none of the*
Princes of the World are to be trusted
with an Excess of Power; that when
 One strives for an *Ability* to do *Wrong*,
 or aims at a *Monopoly* of *Dominion*, he
 becomes that Moment the *Grievance*
 of his Neighbours; who will be sure
 to adjourn all other Debates, and lay
 asleep

asleep every former Animosity, to reduce him to Reason.

If I might add my *mite* in the surprising *Wrangle*, which at present Amuses the Town, it should be only to note, how little any *Minister* acting upon *just Principles*, and *well-weigh'd Counsels*, ought to value the *Noise* and *Raillery* of the *Street*. The Sentiment, tho' common, is prettily heighten'd by the Expression in Mr. *Frowde's* SAGUNTUM.

The best of Answers is a noble Silence.

*Thus Village Currs howl at the silent Moon,
While she serenely glides unclouded on.*

F I N I S.

